States Of Discontent by Handlin, Samuel
Swarthmore College 
Works 
Political Science Faculty Works Political Science 
2021 
States Of Discontent 
Samuel Handlin 
Swarthmore College, shandli1@swarthmore.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
Samuel Handlin. (2021). "States Of Discontent". The Inclusionary Turn In Latin American Democracies. 
254-284. DOI: 10.1017/9781108895835.009 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci/719 
This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in 








Latin America’s recent inclusionary turn centers on changing relation-
ships between the popular sectors and the state, which may adopt and
implement policies and institutions that bestow recognition, promote
access, and enhance redistribution to popular constituencies. Yet the
new inclusion unfolds in a region in which most states are weak and
prone to severe pathologies, such as corruption, inefficiency, and particu-
larism. As Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar note in the introductory
chapter of this volume, state weakness conditions the inclusionary turn in
several ways. The pathologies of weak states fuel demands for inclusion
from popular sector constituencies dissatisfied with poor services and
unequal citizenship while the persistence of these pathologies also con-
strains and hampers the implementation of inclusionary measures. More
broadly, the politics of state weakness has powerfully shaped trajectories
of political contestation and development in some parts of the region,
particularly the nature of the parties and politicians that have emerged on
the Left and become principal protagonists in furthering political inclu-
sion. To understand variation within the inclusionary turn, we need to
appreciate the role of “states of discontent” in shaping the political
trajectories of the inclusionary turn era.
The first part of the chapter outlines an argument, developed at more
length elsewhere, regarding how “state crises” helped drive the consoli-
dation of three distinct party system trajectories among the eight South
American countries where the Left would eventually win power (Handlin
2017). Highly polarizing party systems consolidated in Bolivia, Ecuador,
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and Venezuela, which saw the emergence of radicalized left-wing out-
siders combining sharply anti-neoliberal programs with sweeping anties-
tablishment appeals. Elsewhere on the continent, countries moved on very
different paths. In the trio of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the Left turn saw
the ascendance of long-established left parties that had evolved over time
to embrace a moderate and pragmatic orientation. Their presence
anchored weakly polarized party systems. And in a third pattern, evident
in Paraguay and Peru, outsiders on the Left emerged to win power but
their rise introduced far less polarization into national party systems.
State crises, situations in which states were plagued by inefficiency and
corruption while populations lost confidence in basic governmental insti-
tutions, drove this party system variation. Where prolonged state crises
were avoided, party systems stabilized as political outsiders found little
traction and established left parties successfully consolidated strong pos-
itions on the center-left, thereby anchoring weakly polarized and largely
stable party systems (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay). Where state crises occurred,
in contrast, the entrance of political outsiders, including those on the Left,
disrupted established party systems. Whether these outsiders took the
form of radicals who sharply polarized the political environment
(Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) or relative pragmatists with modest policy
goals willing to work within established institutions (Paraguay and Peru)
rested on the options left outsiders faced for building movements and
coalitions. Where outsiders could build movements on top of an extant
robust infrastructure of left-wing political mobilization, they took radical
forms. Where such infrastructure did not exist, outsiders on the Left were
forced to recruit centrist allies and political advisors, a coalition-building
dynamic that lent itself to greater pragmatism and moderation. In sum,
party system change during the Left turn was driven by state crises but
conditioned by the infrastructure of left-wing politics in each country in
the early days of the post–Cold War era.
These alternative trajectories possessed disparate characteristics along
three dimensions that likely conditioned how the concomitant inclusion-
ary turn unfolded in each case: the institutionalization of major left-wing
parties, state transformation through constitutional reform, and the level
of state performance or capacity. The second part of the chapter discusses
variation in these three characteristics, with two broad analytic goals in
mind. First, this discussion helps us better consider the deeper roots of
variation in the independent variables that might have shaped some of the
inclusionary outcomes discussed in this book, particularly with respect to
social policy and participatory innovations. To be clear, then, whereas
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other chapters in this volume – for example those by Elkins, Garay,
Mayka and Rich, and Etchemendy – focus on those inclusionary out-
comes themselves, this chapter – much like that by Mazzuca – examines
key variables that shaped those inclusionary outcomes and how variation
in those key factors was generated. Second, this discussion helps highlight
the central role of the state and its pathologies in both driving alternative
paths of political development and in conditioning the politics of inclu-
sion. By putting the emphasis on the state and its pathologies in this way,
we can better consider not just the sources of sociopolitical exclusion but
also the limits of sociopolitical inclusion.
     ’
 
South America experienced a consequential turn to the Left during the
first decade of the twenty-first century, with parties or candidates of the
Left winning office in eight of the region’s ten largest countries (Cameron
and Hershberg 2010; Weyland et al. 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011;
Handlin 2017).1 The Left turn unfolded quite differently across these
eight countries, however, with party systems following three trajectories
distinguished by their levels of polarization and whether or not outsiders
played a significant role.
I conceptualize polarization as the left–right differentiation between
component parties in a party system, viewed in terms of both distance (the
spread of the distribution) and intensity (the willingness of opposing
parties to compromise).2 To measure distance, I adopt a commonly
utilized approach that combines data on the strength of parties in the
lower house of Congress and their ideological position on the left–right
1 This chapter, like the book to which it relates (Handlin 2017), focuses on these eight
countries, leaving aside Argentina and Colombia. As discussed at greater length in that
book, the rationale for the case selection was not that party system outcomes in Argentina
and Colombia failed to conform of the predictions of the theory (which they largely do).
Rather, these two cases possessed highly idiosyncratic features – respectively, the remark-
ably durable and amorphous Peronist movement and a civil war involving the Left – that
powerfully conditioned how the Left turn unfolded, setting them off from the rest of the
region. In sum, while these two cases exhibit the outcomes broadly predicted by the theory,
they also serve as reminders of its limitations. These sorts of cases, and the limitations they
suggest, should be openly acknowledged.
2 This approach, considering both distance and intensity, follows that of Sartori (1976) and
can be found in other works such as Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan (2012).
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spectrum.3 To measure intensity, I draw upon a useful indicator from the
Varieties of Democracy project, which captures the degree to which major
political actors respect or do not respect the counter-arguments of their
opponents.4 These two dimensions were then rescaled to be of equal
weight and added together to produce a combined polarization score.
As Table 8.1 suggests, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela came to outpace
all others in terms of polarization by the end of the new century’s first
decade.5 This trio scored highest on both component measures of distance
and intensity. On the aggregate measure, the gap between Bolivia, the
third highest scoring country, and Chile, the fourth highest scoring coun-
try, was greater than the gap between Chile and Brazil, the lowest scoring
country.
Party systems also differed substantially in terms of the rise of political
outsiders, both in general and specifically on the Left. By outsiders, I mean
viable presidential candidates who either possessed no prior background
in politics or who possessed some political experience but ran outside










Ecuador 4.96 5.56 10.51 Yes
Venezuela 5.09 5.23 10.32 Yes
Bolivia 5.30 4.99 10.29 Yes
Chile 4.05 3.74 7.79 No
Peru 3.64 4.01 7.65 No
Uruguay 4.21 3.41 7.61 No
Paraguay 1.39 4.64 6.03 No
Brazil 2.43 3.54 5.97 No
3 I draw upon party ideology data from Baker and Greene (2011), who aggregated several
previous data sources, leaning most heavily on Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2007). To
calculate polarization, I use a common formula which takes the absolute deviation of
the seven largest parties from the party system mean, weighs those values by the vote share
of each party in the lower house, and sums those weighted values.
4 To generate these measures, expert coders from the Varieties of Democracy project assign
values to each country–year case with reference to an ordinal scale that captures different
levels of respect or disrespect for counter-arguments in political discourse and contest-
ation. I took those values and rescaled them from 0–6 to match the range of distance scale.
For more information and discussion of all these choices, see Handlin (2017, 278–283).
5 I present data circa 2010–2011 because by this point the Left turn had fully unfolded
across the region. In many cases, new left parties and movements did not emerge until the
second half of the decade.
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established political parties.6 Party systems in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay
were distinguished by the absence of political outsiders during the new
century. In the other five countries, outsiders on the Left won the presi-
dency in contexts where outsider candidacies had become an established
phenomenon. In Venezuela, Chávez came to power in a 1998 election
contested by two other outsiders, former beauty queen Irene Sáez and
businessman Henrique Salas Römer. In Bolivia, Morales broke into
national politics in the 2002 election and subsequently in 2005, continu-
ing a trend toward outsider politics that had begun with Carlos Palenque
and Max Fernández in the 1990s. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa came to
power in 2006, following a series of other outsiders such as Abdalá
Bucaram and Lucio Gutiérrez. In Peru, Ollanta Humala nearly won the
presidency in 2006 and triumphed in 2011, continuing a pattern of
outsider politics that had begun with the rise of Alberto Fujimori. And
in Paraguay, “Bishop of the Poor” Fernando Lugo won the presidency in
2008, following the breakthrough outsider candidacy of businessman
Pedro Fadul in the prior 2003 election.
Putting these two dimensions together, we can see three distinct party
system trajectories during the Left turn (see Table 8.2). In Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela, radical outsiders arose to contest power, raising
the intensity of politics and presenting steep challenges to the neoliberal
economic model favored by their competitors: With some variation, they
implemented highly distributive and statist programs that Mazzuca (this
volume) has insightfully termed “rentier populism.” In Paraguay and
Peru, pragmatic outsiders arose to contest power, introducing far less
polarization into national party systems. And in Brazil, Chile, and
 . Three party system trajectories









6 This definition is similar to that employed by Carreras (2012).
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Uruguay, long-standing left parties that had moderated their programs
came to power in the context of stable party systems.
   
The diversity of the Latin American Left in the new century, and attend-
ant variation in party systems, has inspired a large set of research seeking
to characterize and explain this variation, with the most prominent body
of explanatory research focusing on economic variables related to neoli-
beralism, such as the success or failure of reforms, patterns of economic
voting, the degree of social mobilization against neoliberalism, the effects
of natural resource rents and endowments, or the particular political
dynamics of market reform (Weyland 2003, 2009; Silva 2009; Madrid
2010; Roberts 2014). This section of the chapter summarizes a new
political-institutional explanation for disparate trajectories of party
system change, developed at more length elsewhere (Handlin 2017).
The theory focuses on the occurrence of state crises and the strength of
left-wing political infrastructure in the period between the end of the Cold
War and each country’s national left turn. State crises undermined estab-
lished parties, including those on the Left, and created opportunities for
political outsiders, particularly on the Left, to enter politics and construct
new political movements and majorities. Whether left outsiders built
movements that took highly radical and polarizing forms, however,
depended on the institutional and political context in which they emerged,
especially the existence of a robust infrastructure of left-wing political
mobilization.
The section first discusses the two key variables (state crises and left
political infrastructure), the scoring of these variables across cases, and
their general role in the argument. The discussion then more explicitly
shows how different combinations of these variables drove the three
different party system trajectories described previously.
State Crises
Most South American states have long been plagued by severe patholo-
gies. They struggle to provide basic services and public goods to large
portions of their populations. Frequently, state agencies are rife with
particularism and corruption, such that officials often prey on the popu-
lations they ostensibly serve. And these pathologies are notoriously
uneven over both geographic and social terrain, such that the
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consequences of state dysfunction are born disproportionately by less
advantaged popular sector groups while political and economic elites
enjoy privileged relationships with officialdom. As such, state pathologies
color the lived experience of citizenship, contribute to various forms of
social exclusion, and have been an important underlying driver of the
inclusionary turn in the region (as Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar
note in this volume’s introductory chapter).
When these “objective” state pathologies are combined with a more
“subjective” deficit of citizen confidence in basic state institutions and
government in general, a “state crisis” – a concept borrowed from
Guillermo O’Donnell (1993) – occurs. During the period between the late
1980s and the early years of the new century in South America, long-
standing state pathologies flared into prolonged “state crises” across
much of South America as this subjective element was added to the
equation. Several factors were likely responsible for driving this latter
subjective dimension of state crisis in the post–Cold War period.
Democracy generated high – perhaps unrealistic – citizen expectations
regarding what democratic governance could deliver while also opening
up channels for shining greater light on the conduct of state officials.
Economic hardship and the tumultuous politics of market reform fueled
citizen discontent with state institutions and increased the salience of
corruption scandals, as citizens experiencing tough times became particu-
larly attuned to the malfeasance of the political class (Seawright 2012).
Five of the eight South American countries explored in this chapter
(Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela) experienced prolonged
state crises in the period between the end of the Cold War and the start of
their own national Left turn. Three other countries avoided deep state
crises, either possessing highly functioning states throughout the period
and therefore never being threatened by crisis (Chile, Uruguay) or falling
into crisis during the early 1990s but then experiencing significant
improvements over time such that a prolonged crisis was avoided
(Brazil). Table 8.3 displays data from two aggregate indices of state crisis,
an “objective” measure that aggregates and averages three of the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (rule of law, control of corrup-
tion, and government effectiveness) and a “subjective” measure that
aggregates and averages measures of institutional confidence (in the judi-
ciary, the police, and Congress) from the Latinobarómetro.7 This table
7 The WGI indicators aggregate a wide variety of data sources on state performance. More
information about data sources and aggregation techniques can be found at the WGI web
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shows each country’s average score on these indices in the period between
1995 or 1996 (when data is first available) and the year in which they
elected a leftist executive. I then translate these quantitative scores into a
more qualitative assessment of whether the country suffered or avoided a
prolonged state crisis during this period.8
As discussed at greater length below, state crises greatly challenged
established political parties and fueled the rise of political outsiders. This
argument builds upon a variety of research that has examined aspects of
state crisis and their impact on party politics. Scholars show that phenom-
ena like corruption have tended to undermine party identification and
lead to voter defection from established parties (Hawkins 2010;
Seawright 2012; Chong et al. 2015). Other studies have demonstrated
the close connection between the perceived legitimacy of political insti-
tutions or “state deficiencies” and the rise of political outsiders









Ecuador −0.80 2.67 Yes
Venezuela −0.85 3.18 Yes
Paraguay −1.08 3.33 Yes
Bolivia −0.50 2.76 Yes
Peru −0.41 3.04 Yes
Brazil −0.12 3.75 No
Uruguay 0.59 4.66 No
Chile 1.23 4.73 No
site (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc) and a more in-depth discussion
about the usage of this data can be found at Handlin (2017, 271–274).
8 This translation is largely intuitive. Uruguay and Chile possessed highly capable states and
mass publics that expressed high levels of confidence in state institutions. They clearly are
nowhere near the threshold for state crisis. On the other side, Ecuador, Venezuela,
Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru were characterized by highly incapable states and populations
that expressed low levels of confidence in state institutions. The trickiest case is that of
Brazil, which lies in the middle of these groups. While this level of detail cannot be
presented here, a closer look at the data for Brazil shows substantial change over time,
with improvements in both objective levels of state capacity and subjective assessments of
confidence in institutions. Brazil is therefore best considered a case in which a state crisis
did occur in the late 1980s and early 1990s but, unlike in other countries in the region, the
crisis was not prolonged. For a much more extensive discussion, see Handlin (2017,
105–109, 274–275).
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(Mainwaring 2006). My work conceptualizes the syndrome more
broadly, as a state crisis, and demonstrates how state crisis drove outsider
politics on the Left during the early twenty-first century through two
primary mechanisms. First, state crises undermined established left parties
where they existed (such as LCR andMAS in Venezuela, FADI and PSE in
Ecuador, and MIR and IU in Bolivia).9 Second, state crises fueled the
electoral campaigns and shaping the strategic direction of left outsiders.
I also depart from other research on this topic by emphasizing the role
of state crisis in enabling political polarization. By their nature, state crises
are conducive to high intensity clashes between outsiders promising to
shake up the system and members of the political status quo threatened by
the entrance of new actors. In fostering clashes along this systemic versus
anti-systemic dimension of politics, however, state crisis also can enable
polarization along other dimensions of contestation. When the electorate
is upset enough with status quo parties and candidates, outsiders capital-
izing on such discontent might still win elections while offering radical
programmatic platforms that are themselves electorally suboptimal.
Strategic choice by outsiders therefore likely depends on the nature of
their own ideal points and their appetite for risk. But when would
outsiders pick particularly radical and polarizing programs and when
would they adopt more pragmatic strategies? Outsider coalition building
hinged on a second key variable.
Left Infrastructure
The occurrence (or not) of deep state crisis in the post–Cold War period
unfolded in countries that differed greatly in the robustness of the infra-
structure of left-wing political mobilization they possessed as the 1990s
began. This term primarily refers to political parties of the Left, defined as
parties and movements with socialist or Marxist roots (or new parties
founded by leaders and activists with those roots) that also possessed a
9 Importantly, this dynamic held even when left parties were not governing. State crises
tended to inflame factional divisions among moderates and radicals within left parties in
general, undermining the attempts of the former to decisively consolidate parties around a
pragmatic, pro-systemic orientation while encouraging the latter to adopt even more
hardline postures. Further, state crises often led voters to punish all parties perceived as
part of the political status quo, not just those who had joined governing coalitions like
Venezuela’s MAS. This was especially true for parties that had significant legislative
delegations and/or wielded real power by negotiating with coalition partners to hold
important legislative posts, such as Venezuela’s LCR and Ecuador’s PS.
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substantial programmatic commitment to the reduction of social and
economic inequality.10 This infrastructure can also be understood to
encapsulate strong left-wing social movements that might have been
important political actors if not (yet) participants in the electoral arena.
Table 8.4 shows the infrastructure of left-wing politics across the eight
countries under study as the post–Cold War era began or, in the partially
aberrant case of Peru, during the first extended period of post–Cold War
democratic rule, after the Fujimori years (1990–2000), during which the
Left was “virtually wiped off the map” (Cameron 2011, 376).11 Left
party vote share reflects the average of the total gained by the Left in
the closest lower house elections before and after January 1, 1990. The
presence of particularly strong left-wing social movements in the early
1990s is a more qualitative measure drawn from examination of the
secondary literature. As we can see, there were six countries that began
the post–Cold War era marked by relatively substantial infrastructures of









Uruguay 25.6 No Yes
Bolivia 24.7 Yes Yes
Venezuela 24.3 No Yes
Chile 22.3 No Yes
Brazil 15.3 Yes Yes
Ecuador 14.3 Yes Yes




10 This definition fuses two common criteria for defining the “Left,” the former emphasizing
a historical definition of the Left as possessing a socialist and/or Marxist origin and the
latter emphasizing the programmatic content commonly associated with left-of-center
parties. Notably, since we want the definition to encompass both radical and moderate
parties of the Left, the extent to which parties emphasize the reduction of inequality can
differ significantly within this definition, ranging from those who make huge changes to
the status quo a centerpiece of their programs to those committed to only relatively
marginal forms of redistribution.
11 Note that the Peruvian experience was greatly different than that of countries like Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela, where established left parties declined or fell apart during the
1990s but, in the context of democratic rule, this infrastructure was quickly reintegrated
into new leftist parties and/or movements.
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left-wing political mobilization (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay,
and Venezuela), one country (Paraguay) in which the Left had made
almost no inroads, and a final case (Peru) in which the Left was substan-
tial during the 1980s, fell into turmoil by the end of the decade, and then
was all but destroyed by a regionally anomalous period of authoritarian
rule, such that it was virtually nonexistent once democracy returned and
left outsiders could compete for the presidency.
Interactive Mechanisms and Trajectories of Change
The interaction of these two variables (occurrence or not of prolonged
state crisis, presence or not of a robust infrastructure of left-wing politics)
put into motion two mechanisms that shaped how the political left
adapted and was incorporated into politics, setting party systems on
different trajectories. The first mechanism related to the prospects of
extant major left parties (if they existed) successfully entrenching them-
selves as major pro-systemic actors in the evolving party systems of the
post–Cold War era. Where the political left was weak, major left parties
did not exist almost by definition, so this mechanism was not relevant.
Where such parties existed, however, the occurrence (or not) of state
crises loomed large in determining their fates. Where a prolonged state
crisis did not occur, established left parties had easier times consolidating
positions as major pro-systemic actors, as they were not punished by the
electorate for ownership of the state crisis and as the absence of state crisis
tended to favor moderate factions who preferred to work within insti-
tutional channels to achieve partisan goals. Where state crisis struck, in
contrast, major left parties attempting to consolidate such positions
tended to break under the weight of voter rejection and factional strife.
The second mechanism related to whether or not conditions were
propitious for political outsiders and the strategic landscape faced by
outsiders on the Left. Where state crises did not occur, the political arena
was essentially closed to the entrance of outsiders. Where state crises
occurred, outsiders of various stripes emerged and challenged for power,
including those on the Left. Whether the emergence of left outsiders was
highly polarizing, however, rested on the strength of extant left-wing
infrastructure and the coalitional logic it spawned. Where a strong infra-
structure existed, left outsiders were incentivized to build new movements
on the Left: They forged alliances with extant left parties, recruited
advisors that were seasoned in left-wing political mobilization, and found
allies in anti-neoliberal social movements. This coalitional dynamic
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incentivized outsiders to embrace more radical economic positions and to
take particularly harsh and confrontational anti-systemic stances. In con-
trast, where left infrastructure was weak, left outsiders had to court
centrist parties and advisors in the search for allies and were consequently
incentivized to attenuate their anti-systemic rhetoric and adopt more
moderate economic policies.
The subsections below discuss briefly how these mechanisms played
out more specifically across the three trajectories of party system develop-
ment, summarized in Table 8.5.
No State Crisis, Strong Left Infrastructure. The first group of cases
consists of those in which prolonged state crises were avoided and a
strong infrastructure of left-wing politics existed as the post–Cold War
era began. The complete absence of state crisis in Chile and Uruguay, or
the avoidance of a prolonged state crisis in Brazil, put two mechanisms
into motion.
A context without state crisis greatly buttressed the attempts of estab-
lished major left parties – the Partido Socialista (PS) in Chile, the Frente
Amplio (FA) in Uruguay, and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in
Brazil – to successfully consolidate positions as major pro-systemic actors
on the center-left during the period leading up to the Left turn in each
country. Unlike elsewhere on the continent, major left parties in these
countries were not punished by the electorate in the 1990s for pro-
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systemic actions such as participating in governing coalitions or assuming
positions of institutional power within legislatures and engaging in horse-
trading with opponents. Rather, each party improved its legislative vote
share and presidential prospects over time. Further, the absence of state
crisis helped each party temper factional disputes and ultimately resolve
them decisively in favor of moderate groups. As elsewhere on the contin-
ent, left parties entered the post–Cold War era deeply divided between
radical factions seeking fundamental transformations to society and harsh
confrontations with the neoliberal order, and moderate factions prefer-
ring pragmatic solutions and more incremental policy gains. In the
absence of state crisis that might lead the electorate to reject status quo
politics, moderates were able to win internal partisan battles within the
PS, FA, and (more gradually) PT by arguing that pragmatic centrism
offered the only viable path to electoral success (Luna 2007; Motta
2008; Hunter 2010).
The avoidance of prolonged state crisis in these three countries also
created little room for the entrance of political outsiders. With states
relatively functional and populations relatively confident in basic state
institutions by regional standards, anti-systemic appeals had little attrac-
tion for electorates, depriving outsiders of their most basic strategies of
mobilization. In Chile and Uruguay, where state crises never threatened,
outsiders were essentially absent in presidential politics in the post–Cold
War period. No outsider won enough of the vote to even play the spoiler
in a presidential election in either country, much less to challenge for
power, during the 1990–2015 period.12 In Brazil, outsiders played prom-
inent roles in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the country experienced a
brief state crisis, but then disappeared from the political landscape after
1994 as institutional performance and public confidence in government
improved.
The ascendance of the Left to power in this trio of countries – with the
victories of Ricardo Lagos in Chile in 2000, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in
Brazil in 2002, and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay in 2004 – helped consoli-
date weakly polarizing and relatively stable party systems in which
12 Marco Enríquez-Ominami, a former PS deputy and the son of a famous PS politician,
won nearly 20% of the vote in the first round of Chile’s 2009–2010 election while
running as an independent. I do not count him as an outsider because he spent the first
half of 2009 angling to run in the Concertación primaries and be the official candidate of
the coalition, first under the banner of the PS and then as an independent. As such, his
ultimate candidacy was not conducted as an outsider to the status quo but as an insider
who had simply failed to secure the nomination he desired.
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outsider politics played little role. The presence of these strong center-left
parties ensured some level of programmatic competition: Perhaps most
notably, in Brazil the PT played an important role in advancing program-
matic politics in a context in which competitors were more likely to
mobilize voters through clientelism and personalism (Mainwaring and
Bizarro 2018). But the blocking of outsiders and the strong position of
center-left parties committed to the rules of the game placed substantial
limits on the level of polarization.
State Crisis, Strong Left Infrastructure. Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela also possessed strong infrastructures of left-wing politics as
the Cold War began but experienced prolonged state crises, a combin-
ation that put them on a very different trajectory. Once again, two
mechanisms were critical.
The occurrence of prolonged state crises severely undermined the
attempts of extant left parties in these countries – MAS and LCR in
Venezuela, MIR in Bolivia, and FADI and PS in Ecuador – to successfully
consolidate positions as major partisan actors on the center-left during the
1990s. In each case, voters harshly punished left parties for pro-systemic
activity, such that a familiar pattern emerged. Left parties in the late
1980s and 1990s ascended in popularity while they could credibly frame
themselves as challengers to the political status quo. As soon as they
became part of that status quo by either joining governing coalitions or
wielding legislative power in opposition, however, voters turned on them
and their electoral fortunes plummeted. Just as problematically, state
crises also tended to inflame factional discord within the Left. Anti-
systemic sentiment in the electorate emboldened radical factions, who
believed that more confrontational strategies might find an audience,
and undercut attempts by moderate pragmatists to consolidate control.
In sharp contrast to the fates of left parties in the prior trio of cases, major
left parties in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela all imploded under the
weight of voter rejection and factional strife during the 1990s.
State crises also drove the rise of political outsiders in all three coun-
tries, including those on the Left. In Bolivia, outsider candidates first came
to prominence in 1993. Eventually, Evo Morales and the MAS built a left-
wing outsider movement that would challenge for power in 2002 and win
the presidency in 2005. In Ecuador, presidential elections were dominated
by outsiders from the mid-1990s until the victory of Rafael Correa and
AP in 2006. And in Venezuela outsiders emerged in 1993 and then
dominated the presidential election of 1998, in which Hugo Chávez and
the MVR came to power. In all three cases, left outsiders rose to power
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while employing a “doubly polarizing” strategy, which combined harsh
indictments of the political status quo and calls for state reform (an overt
politicization of the state crisis) with radical attacks on the neoliberal
economic model.
The programmatic and strategic orientation of left outsiders in each
case was shaped by the environment in which they built movements,
especially the existence of a strong infrastructure of left-wing political
mobilization. Left outsiders forged coalitions with extant left parties,
made alliances with (or emerged from) anti-neoliberal social movements,
and recruited experienced left-wing politicians and activists to run their
campaigns and design their policy programs. In Venezuela, the initial
orientation of Chávez and his Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-
200 was strongly shaped by their alliances and linkages with radical
leftists in the 1980s. Subsequently, Chávez forged a coalition with the
radical factions of LCR and MAS that provided his campaign with crucial
organizational resources, recruited seasoned leftist politicians like Alberto
Müller Rojas to manage his campaign, and relied upon other leftist
intellectuals and politicians to design much of the program he presented
for public consumption. In Ecuador, Correa recruited many different
small leftist parties and social movements into his Alianza País coalition,
which provided critical sources of organization support during the
2006 campaign (Larrea 2008, 129–130; de la Torre and Conaghan
2009). He also drew upon seasoned leftist advisors such as Alberto
Acosta, Fander Falconí, and Ricardo Patiño to develop his program and
guide his political strategy. In Bolivia, Evo Morales and the MAS emerged
from social movements that themselves were deeply influenced by an
influx of seasoned activists with backgrounds in the anti-neoliberal pro-
tests and leftist politics of the 1980s (Van Cott 2003a, 2005; Yashar
2005). Building the movement into one capable of winning majoritarian
elections then required bringing a variety of other leftist intellectuals and
politicians into the fold – perhaps most notably future vice-president
Álvaro García Linera – who were given substantial influence over the
party’s program and strategy. In all three cases, then, the existence of a
robust infrastructure of left-wing politics allowed outsiders to build
movements on the Left, obviating the need to strike moderating deals
with centrist allies and keeping movements tethered to more extreme
policy orientations as radical left intellectuals and activists guided the
strategic course.
The Left turn therefore saw the consolidation of highly polarizing
party systems in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, with radical outsiders
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on the Left coming to power and following through on mandates to
transform states through constitutional reform. The arrival of the radical
Left to power typically provoked strong reactions from opponents and
counter-reactions from the new governments, but party systems eventu-
ally stabilized around a central cleavage that pitted the radical insurgents
and the parties they constructed against a heterogeneous and often frag-
mented opposition.
State Crisis, Weak Left Infrastructure. The third set of cases featured
prolonged state crises and left outsiders building movements in contexts
bereft of left-wing political infrastructure. These conditions clearly char-
acterized Paraguay, where left parties were non-factors in the party
system that emerged in the 1990s after democratic transition. Peru repre-
sents a more complex, and partially aberrant, case. The country began to
experience state crisis in the 1980s, a time when the Peruvian left was very
strong by regional standards, led by Izquierda Unida (IU). At this point,
political dynamics in Peru – including the rise of outsiders and the trouble
that state crisis caused for IU – mirrored those in Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela. The harsh authoritarian rule of Alberto Fujimori, however,
decimated the Peruvian left and effectively put the country on a different
trajectory once democracy was restored, closer to that of Paraguay.
The combination of state crisis and a context bereft of left-wing infra-
structure in Paraguay and Peru (post-Fujimori) fostered the rise of polit-
ical outsiders but created a very different strategic logic of movement and
coalition building on the Left. Outsiders first entered politics in Paraguay
in 2003, with the emergence of businessman Pedro Fadul and the Unión
Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos (UNCE), a Colorado splinter faction led
by controversial ex-general Lino Oviedo. The 2008 elections then saw the
rise and triumph of Fernando Lugo, the former Bishop of San Pedro, who
had risen to national prominence in early 2006 by leading a march of
social movements on Asunción to protest the alleged corruption of the
Duarte government and who had earned a strong reputation as the
“bishop of the poor” owing to his longtime advocacy of land redistri-
bution. In theory, Lugo could have adopted a highly polarizing strategy
combining harsh anti-systemic denouncements of the political class and
radical anti-neoliberal appeals. Yet the coalitional context strongly
shaped and limited his options. Without leftist allies to form coalitions
with and recruit into his movement, Lugo was forced to enter an alliance
with the center-right PLRA to have a chance to win the 2008 election and
to recruit a variety of centrist, established politicians into his government.
This pragmatic approach did not prevent Lugo’s enemies from conspiring
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against him and eventually removing him from office on trumped-up
impeachment charges. But the impeachment controversy should not dis-
tract us from the relatively moderate and pragmatic course that Lugo
chose to take.
The experience of Ollanta Humala in Peru was ultimately similar.
A former military officer from a leftist family background, Humala first
emerged as a presidential contender in 2006 and initially tried to copy the
Chávez playbook, combining anti-neoliberal politics with denouncements
of the status quo and calls for state reform (Cameron 2007). Humala
faced favorable conditions, confronting a weak field of opponents and
running at a time when the radical Left was on the rise in the Andean
region more generally. In a country bereft of left-wing political infrastruc-
ture, however, he faced severe limitations in building a political move-
ment. He ended up running a dysfunctional campaign marked by several
strategic gaffes, that lacked the support of significant parties beyond the
tiny Unión por el Perú (UPP), and which had little articulation with left-
wing social movements. At a time when radicals in Bolivia and Ecuador
won presidential elections by 13 and 26 points, Humala lost by 5.5 in the
second round runoff. In 2011, he learned from this experience and ran a
very different campaign. Without leftist allies to draw upon, Humala
adopted the pragmatism of Lugo, striking deals with establishment figures
such as Alejandro Toledo and Mario Vargas Llosa to win their support
and greatly moderating his platform, such that he would promise broad
continuities with extant economic policies and give up his call for consti-
tutional reform and state transformation (Cameron 2011; Levitsky 2011;
Tanaka 2011).
The ascendance of left outsiders to power in Paraguay and Peru had
very different implications for party system change than in the prior trio
of cases. Rather than reorienting party systems in a highly polarizing
direction along a radical left versus opposition cleavage, the presidencies
of Lugo and Humala introduced relatively little change to party systems.
Given the near total absence of left-wing alternatives at the presidential
level prior to their rise, Lugo and Humala did increase programmatic
competition in national party systems. But such polarization was curbed
by the relatively pragmatic course taken by the two presidents. Further,
dependent upon centrist parties for legislative majorities and pursuing
limited goals with short time horizons, neither Lugo nor Humala invested
significant resources in party building and institutionalizing their move-
ment. As such, party systems remained relatively fluid and marked by low
polarization in the aftermath of their presidencies.
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These three political trajectories differed in ways that had significant impli-
cations for the inclusionary turn in each country. The following discussion
does not focus attention on inclusionary measures per se, a subject
addressed at length by many other chapters in this volume. Rather, like
Cameron’s chapter, it highlights how longer-standing trajectories of polit-
ical development (although much shorter than those considered by
Cameron) entailed important characteristics that likely shaped different
patterns of inclusion: whether the trajectory involved the emergence or
further consolidation of an institutionalized major left-wing political party;
whether the trajectory involved state transformation; and the quality of
state performance in each country during the new century.
Left Party Institutionalization
One important difference across the three case categories involved the
presence and institutionalization of major left-of-center parties. In the trio
of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, highly institutionalized left parties existed
prior to the inclusionary turn and maintained a prominent place in party
systems throughout. As such, these cases were marked by the most
consistent presence of major left parties and the greatest degree of institu-
tionalization of those parties. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, out-
siders came to power and built parties – either from scratch or through
consolidating extant but weak partisan vehicles – once in office. The
transformational agendas and lengthy time horizons of these left outsiders
provided incentives for party building to cement their rule while the
intense polarization that attended their arrival also facilitated party build-
ing, with such searing conflicts helping forge strong partisan attachments
among supporters (Levitsky et al. 2016). In this trio of cases, left parties
still lacked high levels of formal institutionalization but came to possess
real organizations and attracted high numbers of party identifiers. Finally,
in Paraguay and Peru, the arrival of left outsiders to power did not yield
meaningfully institutionalized left parties. With modest agendas and short
time horizons, outsiders did not make the same investments in party
building and lower levels of polarization were not conducive to the
formation of such strong partisan attachments.
These differences in the presence and institutionalization of left parties
had predictable consequences for the frequency with which the political
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Left would hold the presidency during the inclusionary turn. Numerous
scholars have pointed to the spread of left-wing government as a key
factor in advancing inclusion, through extending social policies (Huber
and Stephens 2012; Pribble 2013), supporting more generous social
policy benefits (Garay 2016), developing participatory innovations
promoting access (Goldfrank 2011), and pushing constitutional changes
advancing recognition (Elkins, this volume). We should not overstate
the case: As pointed out in this volume’s introductory chapter, left gov-
ernments were neither necessary nor sufficient for the introduction of
substantively meaningful inclusionary policies. We can find instances of
right-of-center governments pushing inclusionary policies and we can
find examples of left governments that did little to advance inclusion, or
at least certain dimensions of inclusion. Nevertheless, in aggregate,
few would argue that left governments have been more likely than
their competitors to promote inclusionary policies. Therefore, the degree
of left government during the inclusionary turn overall – the proportion
of years in which the Left governed – clearly bore on the extent of
inclusion.
Where strong left parties existed from the start of the inclusionary turn,
the Left was best positioned to win and retain power. During the inclu-
sionary turn period (1999–2018), the Left held the presidency for four-
teen years in Brazil, fifteen years in Chile, and fourteen years in Uruguay.
Where left outsiders took power and invested heavily in institutionalizing
their movements, the Left was also well positioned to hold the presidency
for extended periods. Left governments ruled for twenty years in
Venezuela, thirteen years in Bolivia, and twelve years in Ecuador. Both
these political trajectories created conditions for left-wing dominance of
presidential politics during the inclusionary turn period and, even where
the Left eventually lost power as in Brazil and Chile, positioned the Left to
be major players in politics well into the future.
The major contrast is with Paraguay and Peru. In these countries, left
outsiders took longer to win power, due partly to the absence of a strong
left-wing infrastructure on which they could build their movements. Just
as importantly, since outsider presidents had little incentive to build and
institutionalize political parties, their arrival to power did not set the Left
up for future electoral successes. The Left held power for only four years
in Paraguay (until Lugo’s ouster) and five years in Peru. While other
factors have likely played roles as well (low levels of social mobilization
and institutional rules against presidential reelection, for example), the
relatively short tenure of the Left in office likely helps explain why these
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two countries have experienced less inclusion than the others, whether
assessed in terms of resources, access, or recognition.
Needless to say, the absence of stable, reasonably institutionalized left-
wing parties in these two countries may also dampen their prospects for
future political inclusion. In Peru, Humala’s Peruvian Nationalist Party
completely collapsed in advance of the 2016 elections. The newly-
founded Broad Front, a coalition of small left-wing parties led by
Verónika Mendoza, surged to a surprising showing, winning twenty seats
in Congress and with Mendoza just missing the runoff in the presidential
election. A year later, however, the coalition split in half, with ten of the
deputies leaving to form the new Peru party, now lead by Mendoza. The
future of these parties and movements remains very much in doubt,
especially in the context of Peru’s extremely fluid party system. In
Paraguay, Lugo’s Patriotic Alliance for Change fell apart during his term,
such that the Left had less institutionalized partisan representation after
his impeachment than it had before his political ascendance. Two alli-
ances of small leftist parties contested the 2013 elections, Avanza País and
Frente Guasú. While the fracture left consolidated into the latter in 2018,
its electoral fortunes were meager, winning only six seats in the Senate
and none in the Chamber of Deputies. As in Peru, this new left-wing
coalition lacks institutionalization and its future in the party system
remains very uncertain.
State Transformation
Another important difference across cases trajectories with implications
for inclusion was whether the Left turn involved state transformation. In
the Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay trio and the Paraguay and Peru pair, left
candidates came to power promising to work within the established
institutional landscape. Left governments in all these countries could use
common levers of power such as legislation or executive rulemaking to
advance political inclusion. More broadly, however, inclusionary
responses were bounded by political institutions and, most importantly,
constitutions that were inherited by left governments. In contrast, left
outsiders in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela came to power seeking
sweeping mandates to transform the state. Each made the convocation
of constituent assemblies to write new constitutions a centerpiece of their
triumphant presidential campaigns. After arriving in power, each then set
out to convene these assemblies, to push forward new constitutions, and,
in so doing, to remake the institutional architecture of the state and recast
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the formal basis of state–society relations. It should be stressed that the
concept of state transformation is meant to capture precisely these kind of
changes in the institutional design of the state, and the opening of that
architecture to some degree of political contestation, not to entail the
strengthening or weakening of the state and its capabilities.
Mandates for state transformation were intrinsically linked to out-
siders building radical coalitions in the context of prolonged state crises.
In each case, the push for a politics of state transformation came from
influential advisors within the radical Left, who had developed such ideas
in response to the state’s pathologies. In Venezuela, the idea for a con-
stituent process had been pushed since at least the late 1980s by the
radical factions of La Causa R, as well as radical leftists who played
key roles in the formation of Chávez’s political worldview during this
period, such as Kléber Ramírez (Ramírez 1991; Medina 1992). In Bolivia,
influential MAS theoretician and future vice-president Álvaro García
Linera overtly advanced the notion of a “state crisis” that the party
needed to address and convoked a working group of MASista intellec-
tuals to develop proposals for a constituent process in the years before
Morales won power (Llorenti Soliz 2004; Harten 2011, 138). In Ecuador,
the idea of running on a platform of radical constitutional reform was
pushed heavily by left-wing advisors to Correa who had been involved
with the prior constitutional reform process of the late 1990s (Handlin
2017, 196–197). In sum, these radical processes of state transformation
occurred where two conditions coincided: state crises that fueled demand
for state reform, and processes of outsider coalition building that privil-
eged radical elements of the Left who were long-standing proponents of
the use of constituent assemblies to advance transformative change.
Where state crises occurred but outsider coalitions took more pragmatic
forms, as in Paraguay and Peru, state transformation did not occur. And
where prolonged state crises did not occur at all in the 1990s, as in Chile,
Brazil, and Uruguay, constituent assemblies were off the table completely.
State transformation via constitutional reform relaxed the institutional
constraints faced by left presidents and created more open-ended possi-
bilities for the pursuit of political inclusion on parchment. Such processes
were particularly relevant for advancing two dimensions of inclusion as
conceptualized in the introductory chapter in this volume, the recognition
of previously underrepresented groups and the granting of new channels
of access that enhance popular participation. Regarding recognition, new
constitutions recognized the rights of a variety of previously minority
groups, most notably women and indigenous populations (Van Cott
274 Samuel Handlin
2003b; Segura and Bejarano 2004; Cameron and Sharpe 2010). Elkins’s
(this volume) quantitative comparison of Bolivarian constitutions with
past Latin American constitutions demonstrates just how much the new
documents expanded their “rights portfolios.” In Bolivia and Ecuador,
these new constitutions also explicitly characterized the state as plurina-
tional, a major demand of indigenous groups that fundamentally
reframed what it meant to be Bolivian or Ecuadorian (Becker 2011).
Regarding access, Bolivarian constitutions enshrined new forms of direct
democracy, such as referenda, the ability to recall officials, and/or citizen
legislative petitions (Elkins, this volume). They also placed emphasis on
the importance of participatory democracy, establishing the constitu-
tional basis for the creation of local institutions of participation and
governance (García Guadilla and Hurtado 2000; Schilling-Vacaflor
2011; see also Goldfrank, and Mayka and Rich, this volume). Evidence
suggests that levels of participatory democracy – at least as captured in
indicators from the Varieties of Democracy project – increased in the
aftermath of constitution making (Stoyan 2018).
The politics of state transformation also had negative implications for
inclusion. In each case, a newly elected government steamrolled its oppos-
ition to push through constitutional reform, bending or breaking laws
and norms governing constitutional change in the process (Coppedge
2002; Lehoucq 2008; Madrid 2012; Basabe-Serrano and Martínez
2014; De La Torre 2014; Handlin 2017). Therefore, while state trans-
formation created new possibilities for the expansion of inclusion on
parchment, it also established precedents of political exclusion in practice.
This tension between formally inclusionary politics (particularly vis-à-vis
previously under-recognized social and ethnic groups) and informally
exclusionary practice (particularly vis-à-vis the political opposition) con-
tinued to characterize each of these three cases, with variation across cases
in the degree of the latter. The key overall point for present purposes is
that state transformation differentiated these three countries from the
others in terms of how the inclusionary turn proceeded and was intrinsic-
ally tied to state crises occurring in contexts where outsiders were incen-
tivized to build radical coalitions on the Left.
State Performance
A final consequential difference across the three trajectories involved state
performance, or the objective side of state crisis discussed previously in
the chapter. As suggested by Figure 8.1, state performance remained
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broadly stable across South America during the inclusionary turn, even in
those countries where state crises had catalyzed the rise of outsiders
promising to refound states and reorder state–society relations. Chile
and Uruguay, blessed with the most capable states by far, maintained
that status. Brazil retained its position as the next most functional state
during the 2000s, and then saw a subsequent decline that under the
weight of the corruption scandal the “Lava Jato” investigation has been
uncovering. Those countries that experienced prolonged state crises prior
to the inclusionary turn continued to possess dysfunctional states. There
were a few minor changes within this category: State performance plum-
meted even further in Venezuela and improved somewhat in Ecuador and
Paraguay over time. Overall, however, the picture is one of relative
stability.13
State performance may have multiple and complex implications for
inclusion. Poorly functioning states tend to generate mass demand for
inclusion. Frustration with poorly functioning states may fuel calls for the



























Note: Data for 2001 is not available. Worldwide Governance Indicators produced annual data starng in 2002.
Prior to that, data was collected every other year.
 . State performance during inclusionary turn
13 State performance in Colombia, one of the two major South American countries I do not
analyze closely, did improve somewhat over the inclusionary turn, from a score of −0.56
in 2000 to a score of 0.21 in 2015.
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state officials of minority groups as second-class citizens may drive calls
for the constitutional recognition of the rights of ethnic minorities and
plurinational communities. And popular demand for at least some redis-
tributive policies may be partially driven by states’ ineffectiveness in
delivering these services. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that political
movements enunciating particularly radical demands for inclusion have
tended to emerge in cases where states were highly dysfunctional, such as
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. As the experiences of Paraguay and
Peru show, however, state dysfunction is not sufficient for this kind of
radical inclusionary politics.
Yet poorly functioning states may also limit or condition the ability of
politicians to effectively meet these demands. While political actors may
introduce bills or constitutional amendments to advance the recognition
of previously marginalized groups, state officials may continue to discrim-
inate against those groups in practice. Politicians may launch initiatives to
increase access and foster citizen participation, but those institutional
innovations may function poorly and be prone to particularism. Finally,
legislatures may allocate resources to enhance social policies and improve
infrastructure for the poor, but the impact of such initiatives will be
blunted if many of the resources do not reach the intended target popula-
tions due to corruption or lack of state capacity. In sum, poor state
performance is an important factor maintaining the “parchment–practice
gap” that Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar highlight in the introductory
chapter of this volume. These harsh realities have been most evident in the
case of Venezuela. While initiatives to expand inclusion were particularly
ambitious, the most central of them – including both social programs such
as the Bolivarian Missions and participatory governance initiatives such
as the Communal Councils – have been badly undermined by poor state
performance (even before the country’s recent economic implosion),
which fostered cronyism, inefficiency, and poor policy implementation.
Considered together, these implications of state performance suggest
sobering conclusions. Where states are highly functional (Chile and
Uruguay, to a lesser degree Brazil), we might imagine the political salience
of inclusion fading over time, as state pathologies provide only limited
fuel for inclusionary demands and those policies enacted to address
inclusionary deficits – such as conditional cash transfer programs and
reforms in the health sector – are implemented on sturdy institutional
foundations. In the majority of South American countries with much
more dysfunctional states, however, battles over inclusion are likely to
stretch far into the future: State weakness, which thus far governments
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have proven relatively incapable of changing, will continue to fuel exclu-
sionary practices and thus demands for inclusion. Yet policy initiatives to
further inclusion will be prone to being undermined by the weak insti-
tutional foundations on which they are constructed.
Summary
We can put these three characteristics together to form a more composite
picture of how cases differed along dimensions that might have shaped
the politics of inclusion. Since many other variables also plausibly influ-
enced the nature and dynamics of inclusion, we should not expect that
cases with similar characteristics would all have the same inclusionary
outcomes. Yet examining these different variable constellations may still
help us think about variation in inclusion across South America.
Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay were marked by a pattern of steady techno-
cratic incrementalism. Highly institutionalized left parties competed vig-
orously for the presidency from the beginning of the inclusionary turn and
dominated presidential politics after their initial victories. The specific
degree to which social policies were expanded in terms of resource allo-
cation was conditional on other factors, like the nature of competition for
outsiders and degree of social mobilization (Garay 2016). But the pres-
ence of a strong institutionalized left party guaranteed that at least some
meaningful level of expansion would occur. The extent of inclusionary
innovations in terms of access and recognition, on the other hand, was
limited by the fact that state transformation and fundamental changes to
the institutional environment were never on the table. Finally, in the
context of highly functional states (less so in Brazil), inclusionary policies
were implemented on relatively strong state foundations and were there-
fore more likely to operate efficiently.
Paraguay and Peru were marked by a pattern of limited progress on
shaky foundations. The weakness of the political Left as the inclusionary
turn began, and the lack of commitment of left outsiders to investing in
party building, meant that the Left would control the presidency for only
a handful of years, such that the push for inclusionary measures would be
less consistent and more reliant on non-left parties and politicians. While
other factors may also have played a role, the brief tenure of left-wing
governments in aggregate surely contributed to the relatively low levels of
inclusion in terms of resources. Meanwhile, the pragmatism of left out-
siders ruled out truly transformative inclusionary measures when they did
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hold office. Finally, poorly performing states provided dubious founda-
tions for inclusionary initiatives, threatening their long-term viability.
The last composite pattern, evident in Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela, might be termed transformative inclusion on shaky founda-
tions. Left outsiders invested in party building to better carry out their
long-term agendas, such that their victories were followed by long sus-
tained periods of holding the presidency. State transformation through
constitutional reform greatly broadened the possibilities for advancing
inclusion, especially in the realms of recognition and access. But poor
state performance raised threats to the successful implementation of these
new inclusionary measures, a dynamic especially evident in Venezuela,
such that the parchment–practice gap was likely to become particularly
wide in this trio of cases.

The inclusionary turn in South America unfolded in countries whose
party systems were moving on highly variant paths of development.
This chapter first summarized an argument, developed at greater length
elsewhere, for explaining party system variation in the region during this
period. The latter part of the chapter then made the case that divergent
party system trajectories possessed characteristics that were likely to be
greatly consequential in shaping the dynamics of inclusion. The patholo-
gies of weak states and the political Left represent two common denomin-
ators between these discussions. Party system variation was driven by the
occurrence (or not) of state crises and the strength of left-wing political
infrastructure in each country as the Cold War came to an end, which
together conditioned how the Left would be integrated into and transform
national party systems. In turn, resultant party system trajectories pos-
sessed characteristics likely to condition how inclusion occurred, differing
in the institutionalization of left parties (with logical implications for the
likelihood of left-wing government), the occurrence of state transform-
ation through constitutional reform, and levels of state capacity.
The complex relationships between state pathologies and the politics of
inclusion suggest several general points to draw for this research agenda.
As outlined in this volume’s introductory chapter, the inclusionary turn
was spawned by the coexistence of enduring democracy and deeply
exclusionary contextual conditions, especially multidimensional social,
political, and economic inequalities. But we should not view the politics
of inclusion solely through the simplistic lens of the public voicing
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demands that elected officials have incentives to satisfy. Rather, a more
realistic – and, admittedly, pessimistic – perspective would emphasize the
inability of elected officials to remedy drivers of dissatisfaction like state
pathologies, the ways in which these root causes of exclusion often
undermine inclusionary initiatives and widen the parchment–practice
gap, and the tendency of mass dissatisfaction with state pathologies to
disrupt the party-institutional foundations of representation and account-
ability, arguably making sustainable solutions to social exclusion less
likely.
As such, it may not be appropriate to view the inclusionary turn as a
delimited epoch in Latin American political development, as scholars
often view the neoliberal reform period, the Left turn, or, more distantly,
the first incorporation. Rather, the inclusionary turn is marked by an
ongoing set of sociopolitical dynamics and processes that are temporally
indeterminate. Deep sources of grievance and dysfunctional state insti-
tutions are locked in a relationship that is more likely to be self-
reinforcing than to end in the elimination or amelioration of the former.
It is therefore unclear how, when, or why the inclusionary turn in Latin
America might come to a close. But its dynamics and dysfunction will be
critical to understanding regional politics well into the twenty-first
century.
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